It seems mere common sense to begin any serious discussion of terrorism with an attempt at definition. After all, how can we talk sensibly about the topic unless we know what the topic is? It is true that there are various objections to common sense at this point, but I shall not pursue them here beyond remarking that widespread disarray among theorists about what to count as terrorism suggests the importance of declaring a definitional position at the outset and noting its major intellectual and moral implications.
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A DEFINITION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
It seems mere common sense to begin any serious discussion of terrorism with an attempt at definition. After all, how can we talk sensibly about the topic unless we know what the topic is? It is true that there are various objections to common sense at this point, but I shall not pursue them here beyond remarking that widespread disarray among theorists about what to count as terrorism suggests the importance of declaring a definitional position at the outset and noting its major intellectual and moral implications. 1 My proposal, which I have defended more fully elsewhere, is to concentrate on one key element in common responses to and fears about terrorism, namely, the idea that it involves "innocent" victims.
2
This element features in various ways in many definitional proposals and in much of the heated debate about the evils of terrorism. This focus also usefully provides a point of connection with the moral apparatus of just war theory, specifically the principle of discrimination and its requirement of noncombatant immunity. Of course, terrorism does not always take place in the context of all-out international war, but it usually has a war-like dimension. I will define it as follows: the organized use of violence to attack noncombatants or innocents (in a special sense) or their property for political purposes. This might be thought too restrictive in one direction since the threat to use such 1. It has been estimated that there are more than one hundred definitions in the scholarly and political literature about terrorism and terrorist acts. See Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1983) , pp. 119-58, cited in Walter Laquer, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987) , p. 143.
2. C. A. J. Coady, "The Morality of Terrorism," Philosophy 60 (1985) : 47-69, and "Terrorism," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2d ed., ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte C. Becker (London: Routledge, 2001 Routledge, ), pp. 1696 violence, even where the violence does not result, would be regarded by some as itself an instance of terrorism. If you think that plausible, you could amend the definition accordingly.
I shall call this definition, and others like it, tactical definitions, because they focus on the means and intermediate goals used to pursue political ends. By contrast, there are other approaches that view terrorism essentially in terms of the use of political violence by those who are unauthorized to use it. I shall call these political status definitions. Some of these definitions make it clear that only substate agents can engage in terrorism; others are vaguer but tend to imply this. 3 My version of a tactical definition has several consequences that have struck some commentators as contentious. One is that states can themselves use terrorism, another is that much political violence by nonstate agents will not be terrorist. As to the former, many people would doubtless be surprised at the idea that governments and authorized governmental agencies do or can use terrorist methods for their political purposes, but such surprise is quite often the product of naiveté or prejudice. Certainly if we see terrorism as a particular kind of employment of political violence (and this seems a central strand in all the varied and often confused uses of the expression), then we should surely be impressed by analogies and identities between methods used rather than dissimilarities between the powers and standings of the agents using them.
Some would defend their restriction on the use of terrorism to nonstate agents by locating terrorism as a phenomenon, or as an object of concern, in the arena of civic order and presenting terrorism as a threat to the civic order maintained by states. This is the motivation behind what I earlier called a political status definition. It should be clear that I find this conceptual location a less satisfactory one than that I have provided. This is not only because it makes unavailable the natural characterization of "terrorism" in the case of certain tactics involved in war between states but also because it allows only for one-sided application of the term in conflicts between state authorities and substate revolutionary or resistance groups. This relates directly to the second consequence of the tactical definition because, by contrast, it allows that
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July 2004 nonstate political violence need not be terrorist. The conflict here between the tactical and the political status approaches has important moral and political implications, because, not only is there a widespread belief that terrorism is always wrong, but there are good arguments (as we shall see) to show that it is at least presumptively morally wrong and other arguments to show that it is always morally wrong. Hence, if states cannot engage in terrorism, and all political violence directed against the state by substate or nonstate groups is terrorist, the moral odds are stacked against all broadly revolutionary or dissenting violence. In particular, this move dramatically reduces the scope for making important distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate violent threats to civic order. Though I have no enthusiasm for revolutionary violence as such, I think it wise to preserve the possibility of justified revolutionary violence that can not only plead a just cause but also avoid the taint of terrorism. The status definition also renders illegitimate certain obvious complaints that revolutionaries or, for that matter, innocent third parties themselves can make in the vocabulary of terrorism against certain violent activities of state authorities. It is natural to speak of state terrorism when the state attempts to stamp out revolutionary activity by threatening, harming, or killing the peasants, intellectuals, workers, or villagers who are not themselves engaged in violence. They may be perceived as sympathetic to those who are or as simply insufficiently sympathetic to the government. It is particularly important to make this point in the current climate of the "war against terrorism" since there are a variety of governments throughout the world who are using the antiterrorist campaign to deal drastically with all internal or secessionist oppositionand often to deal with it in ways that raise the question of state terrorism. There is, of course, no need to deny that the use of terror by nonstate groups rather than by the state raises special theoretical issues, and I shall have something to say about this later when discussing "supreme emergency." 4 I have used the term 'noncombatants' to signal a connection with just war theory, but the term might suggest that 'combatants' and 'noncombatants' can refer only to roles in a conventional war. Since terrorism can, and often does, occur outside that context, it might seem that the definition is irrelevant to many occurrences of terrorism. But my use of the term does not mark some simple contrast between warrior and civilian. The just war tradition makes the distinction between combatant/noncombatant or guilty/innocent hinge on answers to the question, who is prosecuting the harms that are believed to legitimate resort to responsive violence? Hence it avoids a complete equation between noncombatant (or innocent) and civilian, and rightly so, since there will be many civilians in armed conflicts (e.g., scientists developing the weapons or delivery systems, political leaders directing the course of the war or violent human rights abuses, and people working in munitions factories) who are engaged in prosecuting the conflict. So understood, the expression 'noncombatant' has some advantages over the word 'innocent', because the latter can misleadingly suggest a rich notion of moral innocence that would count many attacking soldiers as innocent if, for example, they had been coerced to fight. There are further complications of course around this issue, many of which I have addressed elsewhere and will not develop here.
5
The above clarification throws light on an issue that has been thought problematic (see, e.g., David Rodin's article in this issue), namely, whether police violence directed against criminals would count as terrorism according to my sort of definition. This could only pose a problem if (a) we think of criminals as noncombatants because they are civilians and (b) we forget the reference to political purposes in the definition. When police use violence against dangerous criminals for legitimate policing purposes, they are certainly not attacking "the innocent" in any sense and they are usually not acting for political purposes. We might find it odd to call ordinary criminals combatants, but where their stock-in-trade is violence (as opposed to the activities of, e.g., a forger) it is not so far-fetched. Indeed, it corresponds to the way police themselves often think of their antagonists. So, ordinary police force against criminals isn't terrorist, but police can (and do in certain places) engage in terrorism when they use violence for political purposes against innocent (nonharming) citizens. It would be terrorist for police to attack Catholic citizens who are not involved in crime or violent politics in Northern Ireland just to demoralize the Catholic population and discourage them from political opposition to government policy.
THE MORAL ISSUES
So much for conceptual clarifications; let us turn now to moral issues. Is terrorism wrong? Given just war theory and the tactical definition, the answer is, as I have argued more fully elsewhere, clearly yes. 6 Terrorism violates a central principle of the jus in bello, the principle of discrimination, that declares the immunity of noncombatants ("innocents") from direct attack. It is not just that there are good utilitarian arguments for this principle or that it has been agreed between nations. The prohibition lies at the heart of the reasoning that allows for legitimate war in extremis since you are only entitled to wage war against those who are doing a certain sort of harm (and then only if other 
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July 2004 conditions are fulfilled). As John Locke puts it: "They [those among the enemy population innocent of waging the war] ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and injustice that is committed in an unjust war any farther than they actually abet it." 7 Here Locke echoes what is common in the just war tradition.
8
Of course, much more needs to be said about the meaning and significance of 'innocence' and noncombatant status and the sort of wrong that terrorism constitutes. I have discussed the first issue more fully elsewhere; here I will concentrate upon an important aspect of the second.
9 But first let me say two things, by way of precaution. The first is that terrorism is not the only wrong that political violence can commit. The intentional killing of noncombatants is morally reprehensible, but so is the bringing it about that combatants are killed in an unjust war. This is what many thought so morally horrible about World War I where noncombatant casualties were at a minimum. Beyond the tragedy of widespread loss of life in many wars, there is the moral objection that, in some wars, unjust warriors kill combatants whose cause is just. And even the mutual slaughter of combatants in a war that is unjust on both sides has a profound ethical dimension when we consider the moral futility of their deaths and the moral responsibility of those who direct such carnage as occurred in World War I. Moreover, the killing of noncombatants as "collateral damage" can also be a great wrong. These matters deserve separate discussion but I cannot address them further here. The second thing is that the wrong of terrorism, even on my relatively restricted definition, is not undifferentiated. For one thing, attacks upon noncombatant property can be much less grave a matter than direct attacks upon life and limb. There is certainly a moral presumption against such attacks, but it may be rebuttable given grave enough reasons. Presumably, no one thinks that the property of innocent persons is of such significance that nothing could ever justify its confiscation or even destruction. There may even be "attacks" upon persons that are slight enough to allow for justification, as in the violent seizure of uncooperative civilians to remove them from an area where soldiers can then be attacked while the civilians are forcibly restrained temporarily elsewhere. In what follows, I shall ignore these "minor" terrorisms and concentrate upon major harms to persons.
7. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, student ed., ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), sec. II.xvi.179, p. 388.
8. As the sixteenth-century Spanish theologian and philosopher Francisco De Vitoria, in similar spirit to Locke, had earlier put it, "the foundation of the just war is the injury inflicted upon one by the enemy, as shown above; but an innocent person has done you no harm." Political Writings, ed. Anthony Pagdan and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 314-15.
9. Coady, "Terrorism and Innocence."
If one takes the principle of noncombatant immunity that forms a significant part of the jus in bello to invoke an absolute moral prohibition upon intentionally attacking innocent people, as just war thinkers have commonly done, then major terrorism is always wrong and always impermissible.
10 Yet many contemporary moral philosophers, sympathetic to just war thinking, are wary of moral absolutes. Igor Primoratz, for instance, whose position is perhaps nearest to mine, calls terrorism "almost absolutely wrong," thereby endorsing a very strong moral presumption against terrorism and the targeting of noncombatants but allowing for exceptions in extreme circumstances.
11 The situation here parallels what is sometimes said about warfare between states. So, Michael Walzer thinks that in conditions of supreme emergency the violation of the normal immunity expressed by the principle of discrimination is permissible in warfare between states, though only with a heavy burden of remorse. He thinks the Allied terror bombing of German cities in World War II (in the early stages) was legitimated by the enormity of the Nazi threat and the reasonable fear of its imminent triumph.
12 John Rawls recently endorsed this view while condemning the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 13 Neither of these theorists envisages extending the supreme emergency defense to those substate groups who direct political violence against the state. Indeed, in a later paper, Walzer's position disqualifies him from doing so (see below). 14 Let us look more carefully at this. The idea of exemptions from profound moral constraints has taken many different forms in modern analytical moral philosophy. Some of these are closely associated with the philosophy of utilitarianism. In its simplest form, act utilitarianism and certain allied forms of thought hold that all moral constraints are simply rules of thumb that can and should be overruled if calculations of the overall outcomes of so doing show that it is productive of more general happiness than sorrow. This seems to me a deeply misguided view of ethics, but I cannot offer a full-scale rebuttal here. Its principal defect in connection with terrorism is that, in essence, it doesn't allow 10. There is room for further discussion about the sense of "innocent" in which noncombatants are innocent and combatants (even coerced and deluded combatants) are not. These are matters I have discussed elsewhere-see, in particular, " 
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July 2004 that the profound moral constraints against killing the innocent are really profound at all. 15 That is why it calls them "rules of thumb" along with all sorts of other shorthand adages in the moral life.
More subtle versions of utilitarianism, or indeed of consequentialism more generally, can perhaps avoid the charge of trivializing the deep constraint against killing or maiming the innocent by making a case for the depth of this prohibition in terms of the awful consequences of not having such a constraint. Again, I am somewhat skeptical of the success of such indirect strategies, but this is hardly the place to argue for that in detail. The outcome seems to me likely to make the indirect strategist, for most, if not all, practical purposes, a bedfellow of deontologists and other believers in the intrinsic wrongness of intentionally killing the innocent. In connection with terrorism, the interesting question is how this latter group (let us call them intrinsicalists) can allow for exemptions from this basic prohibition.
TWO APPROACHES TO EXEMPTION
Here it seems possible to distinguish two positions though they have a tendency to merge. The first is that associated with many forms of modern intuitionism, as classically expressed, for instance, by W. D. Ross. 16 We might call this balanced exceptionism. The basic outlook is much more widespread among theorists than the intuitionist philosophy itself, but I shall use the intuitionist framework to spell it out. Here, there are various moral principles that are revealed to reflective thought and they give rise to prima facie obligations or prima facie duties. The force of these is generally independent of the calculation of consequences, but whether something is actually obligatory will depend upon whether there are other prima facie obligations that outweigh it, some of which may involve the calculation of consequences, as in the case of a duty of beneficence. So the obligation not intentionally to kill the innocent, being, like all the rest, prima facie, may be overruled by, say, the obligation to advance the good of one's community. In this outlook, no initial prohibitions can be presumed absolute, and the final binding prohibition or obligation determines one's duty with finality and, as it were, without loss. There may be a sense of regret that one cannot avoid 15. I should add that my concern here with the immunity of the innocent is a concern that they not be subjected to direct attack. It is quite another matter whether one is entitled to take innocent life when the "victim" requests it or can be presumed to want death, as in many cases of euthanasia. There are both utilitarian and nonutilitarian arguments in favor of euthanasia, the nonutilitarian arguments emphasizing issues of dignity, compassion, and rights. It is a very rare circumstance, though not perhaps an inconceivable one, where victims of bomb attacks will consent to being killed and maimed. Wherever I refer to "the innocent" in this article I will mean the nonconsenting innocent.
16. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1930) .
doing something that was prima facie wrong-it would be more comfortable if one's prima facie duties did not conflict and need resolution-but no wrong can be attributed to you if you have done the balancing conscientiously. 17 The balanced exceptionist can of course acknowledge that some prima facie duties are stronger than others and hence some presumptive wrongs carry more heft than others. Indeed, the balancing story commits the outlook to this acknowledgment since there would be no point to the talk of balancing as a procedure for decision unless there were such differences of weight. But the fact remains that the granting of exemption from the prohibition on intentionally killing the innocent is part of a normal, even routine, business of balancing presumptive obligations in order to find what is finally obligatory or prohibited. If the scales tell you that it is morally permitted or even morally obligatory intentionally to kill the innocent, then in these circumstances it cannot be wrong to do so.
18
The second exemption position emerges from the discussion of what has been called "dirty hands." This tradition can be traced back at least to Machiavelli, is glimpsed in Max Weber, and has found eloquent modern expression in Michael Walzer. 19 Although it has some affinities with balanced exceptionism, it seems to be distinguishable from that outlook by three things. The first is its emphasis on the political realm as the principal focus for the making of exceptions to what seem to be powerful moral prohibitions; the second is its common emphasis upon the extreme nature of the situations in which the powerful moral rule must be disregarded; and the third, and perhaps most important, is its stress upon the abiding wrongness that is done by the necessary violation of the moral prohibition. Together, these provide a distinct contrast to the intuitionist tradition and balanced exceptionism. In particular, the dirty hands theorists seem to want to treat such moral prohibitions as that upon intentionally killing the innocent as far more than prima facie or presumptive. They think them profound. Theorists such as Walzer 17. Ross does indeed recognize that there can be a sort of residue effect of the fact that a prima facie duty has been overruled. Since we still recognize the prima facie duty as such, then we may feel "compunction" at not being able to fulfill it but "not indeed shame or repentance." And, in some cases, we may have some further duty to make up "somehow" for the right decision not to heed the prima facie duty. See Ross, p. 28.
18. Thomas Nagel discusses something quite close to this sort of balanced exceptionism in his essay "War and Massacre" in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 53-74, p. 62. He calls his version "threshold deontology" and contrasts it both with utilitarianism and absolutism.
19 
Ethics
July 2004 believe that ordinary calculations of utility cannot override these sorts of constraints, but they also hold that such constraints cannot yield at all comfortably to standard countervailing duties and obligations. This second emphasis tends to be implicit in the dirty hands literature, whereas the antiutilitarian point is overt. 20 Nonetheless, despite the contrast, there comes a point at which the gravity of the consequences or the gravity of the conflicting duty can demand the regrettable but morally painful choice to violate such deep norms.
The dirty hands tradition is a complex one, and I have had to simplify it for present purposes. The basic idea that certain necessities of life, especially political life, may require the overriding of profound moral prohibitions in extreme situations is clothed in many different uniforms. Machiavelli sees it as necessity overriding morality, and Weber as a clash between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of absolute ends. In connection with war and violence, Walzer views it in terms of supreme emergency overriding (otherwise) moral absolutes. This raises the question of how such overridings are to be described. We are doing wrong because we must, but if necessity somehow legitimates our act then it seems we are right to do wrong. I have discussed this apparent paradox elsewhere and will say no more here about the conceptual problem except to mention another possible maneuver that seems to require a less paradoxical description of what is going on.
21 This is the position adopted by Nagel, who endorses an absolute prohibition on intentionally killing noncombatants but argues that there are certain extreme situations in which the costs of adhering to the prohibition create a moral dilemma or a "moral blind alley." In these situations, whatever one does is morally wrong. He envisages this as a clash between absolutist principle and very great utilitarian cost in which the agent is pulled in different directions by "these two forms of moral intuition." (It would presumably be possible for the moral dilemma to be created by the clash between absolute prohibition and some powerful positive duty, though Nagel says nothing of this, restricting himself to the clash with utilitarianism.) This position has some affinities with the dirty hands tradition but strikingly differs from it in not coming down on the side of the necessity to violate the absolute prohibition. For Nagel, it would be just as "right" or "necessary" to adhere to the prohibition, but that is quite against the spirit of the dirty hands tradition in either its ancient 20. Walzer's discussions of dirty hands problems (both in "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands" and Just and Unjust Wars) emphasize the contrast with plain utilitarianism, but it is clear that there can be a related contrast with balanced exceptionism. or contemporary forms. Nagel is not interested in creating a path to exemptions, but in showing certain discomforting limitations to our moral outlook. 22 His alternative approach tells us something interesting about the dirty hands tradition and is particularly relevant to what I shall argue below is its pro-state bias.
If we are to allow exemptions from profound moral prohibitions that remain somehow in force, though rightly ignored in the particular case, then how are we to characterize the conditions under which such exemptions apply? Terms such as 'necessity' or 'supreme emergency' are very vague and open to diverse interpretations, not to mention exploitations. Machiavelli has in mind the necessity for the ruler ("the Prince") to gain and maintain power and "glory," but, although this is a powerful drive for all politicians, it is surely far too thin a value to legitimate the slaughter of innocents. More generously, we might treat him as arguing that the survival of the state is the value in question. This idea can be seen also in Weber and Walzer, but it dangerously opens the door to the identification of the state's survival with that of its political leadership. It is not only ancient French monarchs who think that their departure betokens the deluge or that they are the state. We shall explore this issue further below.
DIRTY HANDS AND SUPREME EMERGENCY
To focus our discussion more concretely, let us take the supreme emergency defense that Walzer offers for one contentious military policy, namely, the area bombing of German cities in World War II. Walzer does not defend the bombing unequivocally. He thinks that, though it was morally wrong as a violation of the principle of discrimination, it was justified by the plea of supreme emergency in the early stages of the war. In the later stages, however, it was just plain morally criminal since an Allied victory could be reasonably foreseen on the basis of morally legitimate targeting and fighting. The bombing of Dresden was therefore an outright atrocity, though the area bombing of other German cities earlier in the war was not. Walzer is a little unclear about when the justification of supreme emergency ceased, but it seems to have been around the middle of 1942.
23 He is even less clear when it began to apply since the formal directive to attack civilians and their homes dates from February 14, 1942, though there was some city bombing in violation of the "war convention" during the early years of the campaign. 24 He is clear that any deliberate area bombing earlier than 
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July 2004 mid-1942 was a violation of the principle of discrimination and several times refers to "terror bombing" and twice to "terrorism." 25 It was morally wrong, but had to be done.
Although Walzer's position on the bombing has become something of an orthodoxy among philosophers and political theorists, there is considerable evidence that the supreme emergency defense here is defective even on its own terms. Allowing satisfaction of his first condition, that a Nazi conquest of Britain would have been a disaster, we may nonetheless legitimately doubt the applicability of the other conditions Walzer requires, namely, the imminence of the threat of defeat and the effectiveness of the means employed to ward it off. There is good reason to believe that the prospect of imminent defeat was clearly gone by February 1942, when the decision explicitly to adopt the policy of terror bombing was taken, and it had probably dissipated even earlier when the Battle for Britain was won in late 1940. As for the likely success of the terror bombing, which must figure to some degree in any defense of the strategy, we now know that it had minimal impact on the German war effort and that the British leadership was in a position at the time to appreciate its futility.
26 I have developed this critique in detail elsewhere and shall not argue it further here since I am primarily concerned to examine structural problems in the supreme emergency defense.
27
But it is important to note that Walzer's prize example of the applicability of the supreme emergency exemption does not have the plausibility he and others have attached to it.
In what follows, I shall argue that there is an illegitimate pro-state bias built into Walzer's deployment of the argument and that the justification of substate terrorism on grounds of supreme emergency should therefore be more available than he allows. I shall also seek to show that the category of supreme emergency is too opaque to do the work required of it and that its employment in the public discourse of justifying political violence is too dangerous.
THE PRO-STATE BIAS
A striking curiosity of Walzer's argument is that it is presented only as an argument available to states and their representatives. This is not 25. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 255, 260. 26 . As early as the autumn of 1941, for instance, Churchill wrote: "It is very disputable whether bombing by itself will be a decisive factor in the present war. On the contrary, all that we have learnt since the war began shows that its effects, both physical and moral, are greatly exaggerated." Quoted in Garrett, p. 14.
27. In a different version of the present article, to be published in Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, ed. Igor Primoratz (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), forthcoming. See also Garrett for a review of the evidence, and especially chap. 6, for discussion of the practical doubts about the bombing and the case for alternatives to it. exclusively true of the tradition of the dirty hands debate (it is less true of, e.g., Weber), but it is a pronounced emphasis of Walzer's treatment. In Walzer's case this is particularly strange because he derived the term 'dirty hands' from Jean Paul Sartre's play of that name and Sartre's play is concerned with the supposed need for revolutionaries to violate morality in the furtherance of their cause. In spite of this, Walzer's framework, and that of many others committed to the idea of dirty hands, is basically that of the duty of statesmen to preserve their polity or civilization. 28 But, if we think only of the connotations of 'supreme emergency' and the conditions mentioned earlier, it is not at all obvious that the issue can be so restricted. Palestinian resistance groups, for example, can mount a strong case that they face a hostile power bent upon subordination and dispossession to a degree that threatens not only their lives but their way of life. The danger is clearly imminent and many of the militants would argue that terrorism is the only means of overcoming it.
In his discussion of supreme emergency, Walzer makes his pro-state bias quite explicit: "Can soldiers and statesmen override the rights of innocent people for the sake of their own political communities? I am inclined to answer the question affirmatively, though not without hesitation and worry." 29 And he goes on to speak of nations in a way that identifies political communities and nations. Of course, Walzer's language here leaves logical space for the idea that nations or political communities can be driven by necessity even where they do not possess a state or have been deprived of one. Yet it is clear that recourse by such people or their real or imagined leaders to supreme emergency is far from his mind. Indeed, in another place, where he is explicitly concerned with substate agents employing terrorism, Walzer argues that such terrorism can never be justified or excused. Although he doesn't define terrorism very clearly, it is obvious that he is operating with a version of the tactical definition, saying such things as " [terrorism] . . . is indefensible now that it has been recognized, like rape and murder, 28. Walzer does give one example that hardly involves the salvation of the state, but again it is heavily state oriented. It is the example of the politician running for high political office who does a deal with a dishonest ward boss and his contractor friends in order to ensure his election. For several reasons, I don't think this is a convincing example of dirty hands, but the story gets what plausibility it has from the supposition that it is very important politically that the candidate be elected. See "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," pp. 165-66. 29. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 254.
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as an attack upon the innocent." 30 He makes his total condemnation explicit: "I take the principle for granted: that every act of terrorism is a wrongful act."
31 Although even this leaves theoretical room for a dirty hands move to claim the wrongful act as necessary, it is clear that Walzer does not envisage such room being available for substate terrorists. In fact, his article is devoted to examining excuses for terrorism since he takes it as axiomatic that there can be no justifications of any sort. But he reaches the same conclusion about excuses, even though some of the excuses that he examines are formally very similar to the necessity arguments he endorses as justifications under the rubric of supreme emergency in the case of the terror bombing of World War II. Most notably, he holds that the argument that no other strategy is available is never a valid reason for terrorist acts, even though it figures so prominently in his case for the necessity of the Allied terror bombing.
32 He seems to have forgotten his description of that bombing as "terrorism."
But why should states enjoy the supreme emergency license when other groups do not? This is particularly pertinent when we admit, as Walzer earlier did, that states can employ terrorism (in the tactical sense). The primacy of the political community that Walzer sees as validating the special role of (most) states is highly suspect. Walzer admits of individuals that they can never attack innocent people to aid their self-defense. 33 He then adds: "But communities, in emergencies, seem to have different and larger prerogatives. I am not sure that I can account for the difference, without ascribing to communal life a kind of transcendence that I don't believe it to have."
34 Walzer goes on to try to locate the "difference" in the supposed fact that "the survival and freedom of political communities . In discussing what he treats as a further excuse, that "terrorism works (and nothing else does)," he adds that this efficiency excuse depends for its success on that of the "only option" excuse or that of the structurally similar "last resort." 37 Indeed these three excuses are closely related, and, as Walzer admits of the efficiency test, it goes beyond an excuse and aims to constitute a justification in consequentialist terms. If so, the question of a dirty hands justification surely arises, and Walzer even mentions the dirty hands of the terrorists, but he doesn't invoke any form of supreme emergency on their behalf. This must be, at least in part, because he thinks that the consequentialist considerations are defective in their own terms. As he argues: "I doubt that terrorism has ever achieved national liberation-no nation that I know of owes its freedom to a campaign of random murder-although terrorism undoubtedly increases the power of the terrorists within the national liberation movement." These arguments are hardly decisive as they stand, and they become still less persuasive when set against what Walzer says of the World War II bombing. As to the arguments themselves, the claim that terrorism will work (and nothing else will) need not mean that terrorism must work all by itself, as Walzer's comment about failure to achieve national liberation might suggest. The "nothing else" claim need only mean that nothing else will fulfill the role that has been assigned to terrorism. Hence the terrorist is not committed to the view that national liberation can be achieved by terrorism alone. So understood, the question is whether terrorism has ever made a crucial, irreplaceable contribution to national liberation (or the achieving of the significant revolutionary goals, whatever they are). To say the least, this is a very difficult matter to decide. Did the terrorism of groups like the Stern gang play such a part in establishing the state of Israel? But, in any case, the question is structurally very similar to the one Walzer poses for the legitimacy of the British bombing.
As we saw earlier, Walzer is sympathetic to the only option story for the early stages of the terror bombing even while admitting that serious studies subsequently indicate the campaign to have been futile on its own terms. He thinks Churchill had to gamble because the stakes were so very high and the danger imminent. Walzer doesn't, of course, think that this means that probability has no relevance to the gamble but just that the estimated probability doesn't have to be set so high. It can also be pretty vague. As Walzer says, of the bombing, "It makes no sense at this point to quantify the probabilities. I have no clear notion what they actually were or even how they might be calculated given our present knowledge, nor am I sure how different figures, unless they were very different, would affect the moral argument." 39 This is strikingly at odds with what he says about nonstate terrorists who argue that attacking noncombatants is the only option they have. They have no such latitude with probabilities, no matter how imminent and awful the threat. It seems that threats to their political community can never be great enough to constitute the sort of "immeasurable evil" that Walzer sees in the Nazi threat.
40 I am at a loss (inevitably) about gauging "immeasurable" evils, but it would not seem impossible that various struggles against brutal, murderous, tyrannical regimes could sometimes reasonably be viewed as confronting supreme emergency. Of course, they cannot hope to succeed against a totalitarian state, according to Walzer, because terrorism never can succeed against a totalitarian state. Yet the terrorism of the bombers was itself directed against a totalitarian state 39. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 259. 40. Ibid. and was posited on the subjects of that state being able to influence the state's policy and workings.
We should conclude that the attempt to restrict the supreme emergency exemption to states is unpersuasive. Either it applies more generally or it does not apply at all.
THE SECOND DIFFICULTY
This brings me to my second difficulty with the category of supreme emergency. If we reject Walzer's attempt to restrict the supreme emergency exemption to states, the question arises whether the broadening of the potential application of supreme emergency considerations provides a reason for skepticism about the category itself. Those in the dirty hands tradition who restrict its application to the sphere of state politics are partly moved by a certain romanticism about the superiority of the values served by states and by politics more generally. But they are also concerned to preserve the rarity value of the dirty hands exemption. As the name suggests, the supreme emergency story, as a version of the dirty hands tradition, gets its persuasiveness from the idea that its disruptive power to override profound moral prohibitions is available only in the rarest of circumstances. Any broadening of the reach of those circumstances tends to reduce the rarity value of the exemption and hence increase the oddity of the idea that it can be right to do what is morally wrong. Why not allow that the exemption can apply to huge corporations, the existence of which is central to the lives and livelihoods of so many? Or, contrary to Walzer's declared position, to individuals when they are really up against the wall? Yet, the more we move in this direction, the more the currency of supreme emergency is devalued.
These considerations suggest that the category of supreme emergency, in spite of its surface clarity, is conceptually opaque. This opacity is alarming enough in itself since it means that those using the concept may not be making clear sense, even to themselves. Yet, in the context of public discourse about war and terrorism, we should be particularly worried about allowing exemptions from profound moral and legal constraints under categories that are, at the very least, so open to divergent interpretations. Both the morality and legality of political violence must be concerned with the dangerous consequences of allowing justifications or exemptions that are likely to be exploited by any side to a conflict. On Walzer's own account, the "legitimate" resort to terror in the early stages of World War II led rapidly to its illegitimate use thereafter with disastrous human consequences for hundreds of thousands of German civilians. Moreover, one party's resort to supreme emergency is likely to encourage other parties (including the current enemy) to tread the path of exemption; they are unlikely to cede the point that the original violator's resort to exemption is legitimate where their own is not. And
